18 July 2024

Understanding the Old Country Part 3: Ukrainian nationalism and Orthodoxy

 Orthodox Church of Ukraine | History, Recognition, Patriarchate, & Facts |  Britannica

As I've previously related, Ukrainian nationalism is inextricably tied to Uniatism and a tendency to go into schism.


So besides Uniatism and the Papist roots of proto-Ukrainian statehood, what else is heterodox about Ukrainian nationalism?   A simple answer:  It throws away the vision and identity of "Holy Russia" and puts in its place a Uniate national idea - an idea that always gains outside support from western powers.

A more precise and philosophical answer: 
Its Anti-Monarchism and its rebuke to the Orthodox East.  A very appropriate theological articulation of Tsarism was given by a martyred hierarch of Kiev.  Here is a quote from the New Martyr St. Vladimir, Metropolitan of Kiev, during his trial by the Bolsheviks.  He was commenting on the Revolution:

“A priest who is not a monarchist is not worthy to stand at the altar table. The priest who is a republican is always a man of poor faith. God himself anoints the monarch to be head of the kingdom, while the president is elected by the pride of the people. The king stays in power by implementing God’s commandments, while the president does so by pleasing those who rule. The king brings his faithful subjects to God, while the president takes them away from God.” 

And St. Vladimir the New Martyr echos ancient fathers such as Eusebius of Caesarea: 
“Monarchy is superior to every other constitution and form of government. For polyarchy, where everyone competes on equal terms, is really anarchy and discord.”

You can find other patristic quotes along these lines.

To be clear though, I would like to make a distinction:  There is a difference between living in a society like America, where there is no state monarchy, a place whose earliest roots were Anglo Saxon settlers possessing the Anglo Saxon mistrust of authority, during an age of new political theories in their home country which continued to develop in the New World; versus living in a place like pre-revolutionary Russia, where an Orthodox monarchy was established.  There was a deliberate rebellion against this rightful authority by Ukrainianists.  And today their narratives continue to denigrate it, undermining the witness of the Orthodox Church.

Why this matters today is because the narratives of Ukrainianists stand in the way of restoring a proper Christian monarchy to Russia and Ukraine.  But more importantly than that, these narratives oppose traditional Orthodox governance and ethos in general.  When you make that the official narrative in the second largest country in the Orthodox world, you have a problem.  This is a long-term consideration.  One of the reasons why Ukrainianism is a darling of the west, and enjoys continued support, even with my own tax dollars, is because it is anti-monarchical.  Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric views the Tsar as an evil doer, instead of as the rightful Orthodox ruler of All Rus.  It violates the Old Order of Christendom and embraces Liberalism.  It rejected the rightful Tsar of the Rus and sought to replace him with a western style republic.  It rejected the reunion of the Russias, and substituted a Uniate or "Orthodox Lite" state.  Today, Russia is not a monarchy, but it could be again one day after more development.  The national narrative of Russia puts things on a course back toward Tradition, whereas Ukrainian national narratives undermine it and send things in the opposite direction.

Ukrainianism pushes Ukraine toward a so called "European future."  They see Ukraine as developing in the same Progressive social pattern as western European (heterodox) countries.  They argue that Ukraine was always a "free" country whereas Muscovites were/are slaves.  This is not true at all, and is a later retcon of history.  Very telling is that fact that there were numerous rebellions against the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in both Ukraine and Belarus from 1596 onward.  And yet after the Partitions of Poland and reunion of the Russias, rebellions by the ancestors of today's Ukrainians and Belarusians were rare.

Likewise, New Martyr St. Vladimir's successor, Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky) of Kiev, also suffered, and was imprisoned by Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petliura, when the Ukrainianists took over Kiev and formed their short-lived state.  Metropolitan Antony later  served as a ROCOR Metropolitan after evacuating with White Emigres.  He was a man of great holiness and obedience to Tradition during his career as a hierarch.  He had a fascinating life, and I would strongly recommending reading more about him.

What does this have to do with right now?  The process that is unfolding at the moment is the destabilization of the region and spread of hatred.  Who is guilty?  One party?  I think not.  But for certain, there are forces that set up this situation and prevent something better.

I would also bring up, that most people in ROCOR, including their hierarchs, both past and present, essentially believe what I believe.  That jurisdiction was more vocal about it than our historic OCA (Russian Metropolia) people, because they tended to be more educated, more political and many had fought the communists.  ROCOR was and is far more interested in articulating traditional Russophila than the OCA.  And yet, as with the OCA, ROCOR was actually dominated by hierarchs with roots in what is now Ukraine, namely: 
 
1. Metropolitan Hilarion (Kapral) who died recently.  His parents immigrated to Canada from Volhynia, in western Ukraine.  His first language in the home was Ukrainian, and he learned Russian later in life.  And yet he considered himself a Russian man, and essentially articulated the "Russian World."
2. St. John of Shanghai and San Francisco was from Kharkov.
3. Archbishop Vitaly (Maximenko) 
4. Archbishop Alypy (Gamanovich)

Remember, ROCOR was always more Russophilic and more Tsarist than the OCA.  Yet it was and is dominated by people rooted in what's now Ukraine! 

16 May 2024

A note on the tone and subject matter of A Son of the Metropolia

The internet often makes us cold and terse.  This is something endemic to it.  My writings have been no exception.  My words in my articles tend to be subdued and formal, but my words on Twitter have not followed this template.

Twitter is a place where abrupt messages are fired off, and where virtually everyone is confrontational.  It comes with the territory.  When you post on Twitter, you invariably end up getting into some kind of argument, and firing off quips and jabs at something you detest is a daily occurrence.  Teasing and being flippant are the norm.  Such is internet culture.  It is a culture where "bantzing" and "dissing" is how you engage both friends and enemies.  Crude humor is a lubricant for touchy subjects. 


I started this primarily as a place to talk about Orthodoxy, particularly Russian Orthodoxy in the US.  It was also my objective to talk about Russian culture, particularly the variety found in the OCA, in all of its vibrant and vestigial forms.  Today Russian culture is under attack much more than usual.  I have responded to detractors and pieces of media that I have found to be troublesome.  I have responded to things that I detest.  But I have been rude in my moments of righteous indignation, particularly with regard to attacks on the Orthodox Faith.  As of late, Orthodoxy has been under direct attack in the land of our ancestors: Ukraine.  The Church there is in a state of crisis both because of the war and because of the Ukrainian government's persecution.  Georgia is experiencing political upheaval and could be on the eve of a western-backed color revolution.  Belarus is in a precarious position in which it could soon undergo the same kind of nationalist modification/invention process that Ukraine (Little Russia) has been subjected to.  I have participated in poking fun at those whom I believe to be threatening Orthodoxy and spreading social liberalism in the Orthodox World. 

I ask your forgiveness if I have caused harm.  I am passionate about Orthodoxy, and believe strongly in the justness and rightness of Russian identity over alternative identities and nationalisms that are at odds with it.  I also feel that it is constructive to poke fun at some, even directly insulting them, using the same tools of desacrilization and humor that they use against us. 

10 February 2024

Understanding the Old Country Part 2: Competing national visions: Ukrainianism versus Russophila

This series continues, amid the buzz surrounding Tucker Carlson's interview this week of Vladimir Putin.  A long, complicated history was discussed during the course of that interview with mixed reactions around the world.  Hopefully this multi-part series, written from the perspective of a descendant of pre-Revolutionary Russian immigrants to America, who came from the regions in question, will shed light on the issues discussed.  My content tends to fixate more on religious issues than others, but this is probably worth a read, even by those who are not primarily interested in religious affairs in Ukraine.  My argument is that religion actually did play a major role in the development of Ukraine, as it does in virtually every other region of the world. 

Competing national visions: Ukrainianism versus Russophilia

There are competing visions everywhere.  In Ukraine, historically, there are 2 opposing visions regarding identity, nationhood, and sovereignty.  Since the coup d'etat of 2014, these 2 visions, being held by native citizens of Ukraine, have even duked it out on an actual battlefield.  While there were other visions at times, these 2 are the most relevant and impact the world today the most: Russophilia and Ukrainianism.  Other less relevant or popular visions would be:  Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth Identity, Neosoviet, general separatism, and apathy. 

Ukraine was not "liberated" from Tsarist rule, it was broken off by the heterodox west, and by the heterodox within Ukraine.  Besides the political associations with Muscovy, the way that people actually felt in Ukraine prior to WW1 was fundamentally different than today.  Ukraine's nationalist movement is more of a political movement than anything.  It used to be called, "Ukrainstvo" translated literally "Ukrainianism."  It is an "ism" and it had specific leaders and emerged from a specific group of people.  The reasons for the spread of this movement are complicated, difficult to track, and often misunderstood.  It is not cut and dry.  For that reason, the true story of Ukraine, the objective history, is never told in western media.  There is both ignorance, as well as a willful, politically-motivated intent to distort it.  An abbreviated, politicized, romantic narrative following the "David vs Goliath" architype is told.  There are geopolitical reasons for this, in addition to romanticism.

Russophilia is the term I'd use to describe the vision of the Russian nation according to traditional tsarist sensibilities.  It is difficult to say when the basis for this idea emerged.  One could say that it began when the Duchy of Moscow first began to retake Russian lands from Lithuania, which seized about half of "Kievan Rus."  It's starting point could be traced to the founding of the Tsardom in the 16th century, when the Rus finally had a king as opposed to antagonistic princes in divided micro states.  Or one could say that it emerged with the concept of Moscow as a "3rd Rome."  Russophilia is the idea that these Rus people, who all equally share in the heritage of Kievan Rus ought to have unity.  After the Mongol Invasion, the lands were decimated, creating a power vacuum.  Lithuania and Poland swept in, sometimes with blood, and seized the western Russian lands.  This is the only reason why Belarus and Ukraine developed separate characteristics from what we call "Russia" today, such as their own dialects and other peculiarities.  But Russophilia does not see itself as a movement rooted only as far back as the 16th century, but rather as the celebration and continuation of what always existed back to the beginnings of the Rus in the 9th century.

Russophilia is, objectively speaking, more Orthodox than Ukrainianism.  Ukrainianism was primarily a Uniate political orientation that emerged in Galicia, within the Austro Hungarian Empire prior to WW1.  It was advanced as an alternative to the Russophilia of those Uniates who were converting back to Orthodoxy in that region.  There were some Uniates that became Russophiles, putting them on a course back to Orthodoxy.  Because of this, the Austro Hungarian government assisted and promoted the Ukrianianists and repressed the Russophiles within their territory.  The Uniate clergy were also instrumental in spreading Ukrainian nationalism.  The Uniate Ukrainian vision was one of a Catholic, western-backed, smaller version of Russia, which vicariously operated in the line of succession from the old Kingdom of Galicia (which was made a kingdom by the crowning of Prince Daniil Romanovich by a Papal legate, the only Rus prince to submit to Rome, though he purportedly did not apostatize from Orthodoxy).  In a sense this nation of Ukraine would be the true successor to Kievan Rus, not Muscovy.  This was an idea that was and is backed by foreigners such as Poles to this very day.  This alternative nationhood, this western-backed national idea, this "Antirussia", claims more exclusive rights to the heritage of Kievan Rus.  It views Muscovy as something foreign, dirty, unsophisticated, uncivilized.  But most of all: foreign.  It denies the connection to Moscow, and celebrates the connection to the western Catholics.  It denies that the Rurik Dynasty moved to Moscow, while the local Little Russian establishment was slowly Polonized.  It denies that the Metropolitan See of Kiev and All Rus moved to Vladimir (an ancient city in Russia, near Moscow) and then to Moscow, in order to protect it from the heathen Lithuanians who occupied Kiev (and it was moved by St. Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow, who was himself a Galician!).  This movement, with its narratives, is the direct ancestor of mainstream Ukrainian nationalism today, both in terms of spirit, but even in terms of direct lineage through nationalist leaders and academics.

Within the Russian Empire, Ukrainianism was much much weaker and took on more of a political form than a folk nationalist form.  It was composed primarily by anti-monarchical liberals who sought an alternative identity and statehood formation to the Russian Empire.  One that was more local and democratic.  The reason some of them were repressed by the state was because they were rebels.  It was a mirror image of the repressions against Russophiles in Austria Hungary, and on a much smaller and less severe scale.  Some of these Ukrainianists within the Russian Empire were actually looked upon favorably in elite circles; a sort of curiosity in the age of Romanticism.  There was also a small reaction against Russification (language policy) though nobody seems to admit that Russification replaced the Polonization which came before it.  At the time it was mostly academic.  All attention and moans are directed at Muscovites, the actual, real brothers who reunited and provided an authentically Rus state, and no attention paid to the Polonized gentry, whose Polish language dominated the Little Russian upper classes, relegating the vernacular (that would later be developed into modern Ukrainian) to an unwritten peasant language.  The Polish domination is what made Ukraine separate, and yet Russia, or more precisely the Great Russians/Muscovites are the villains for reuniting and defending Orthodoxy, which was previously suppressed by the Poles.  This dismissal of Moscovite unity and consolidation, and a half-hearted celebration of Polish/Lithuanian domination is the core of the Ukrainian national idea.  (And when it comes to the relationship between Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, there is a lot to unpack, particularly when discussing nationalisms.  It is complicated.)

And here is the kicker: Ukrainianism was not even popular until Germany occupied what we now call Ukraine during WW1.  A religious component in these questions of identity was very visible in the pre-WW1 immigration to America.  For topics of ethnicity and nationalism it is useful to study religious organizations since they consist of organized communities of people, and serve as centers of culture.  But perhaps all the more so because of the role that religion plays in ethnic and national identity.  Those who identified as Ukrainian were almost all Uniates.  So very many people who came to the US and built the North American Russian Orthodox Metropolia, that later became the Orthodox Church in America, were from Ukraine yet called themselves Russians and identified with that culture.  And those people were mostly from western Ukraine, not Donbass, not Crimea, or other eastern regions of Ukraine that tend to be pro-Russian today.  There were some of these people who, after being in America or Canada for decades, decided that they were "Ukrainian" when they looked at maps of the Soviet Union and saw that the region their parents or grandparents were from was in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

It is noteworthy also that the Ukrainian language did not exist until the 19th century, and it was based primarily upon the Galician dialect.  Galicia had been controlled directly by the Kingdom of Poland for centuries, and their vernacular took on many Polishisms; whereas those to the north and east were dominated by Lithuania, which had little linguistic impact, and the vernacular was closer to Russian.  Later, the Soviets made the people in the north and east of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic learn Ukrainian, a language that was as foreign to them like Muscovite Russian language was to a Galician in 1900.  To be clear: the vernacular language spoken by peasants in Little Russia, within the Russian Empire was not equivalent to modern Ukrainian, nor did they call it Ukrainian.  Immigrants from these regions to America typically referred to their regional vernaculars as "Village Russian" or "Low Russian."

The Ukrainianist vision sees Ukraine as embracing a social evolution akin to that of the west, instead of the Orthodox east.  This is opposed to the Orthodox, eastern resistance to western liberalism, and the whole process of development of Papism and Protestantism that preceded it.  This is a version of Progressivism.  There is a good reason why pro-LGBT and other advocates for social liberalism in Ukraine are ardent Ukrainian nationalists, and were always very anti-Russian.  They see the future of Ukraine being very liberal and decadent; basically Ukraine "evolving" into what western European countries are like right now.  This is noteworthy as in most of the world the Social Left tends to be anti nationalist.

The Germans supported Ukrainianism twice during their WW1 and WW2 occupations to create disunity and prevent partisan activity.  The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists developed the Ukrainian national idea in Interwar Poland and spread it.  The Soviets reinforced it through Indigenization Policies and the formation of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, possessing the very same borders as the modern Ukrainian state, minus the region around Lvov which was part of Poland until the end of WW2.  In 1991, 3 men got together in Belovezha Forest and decided to break Russian, Ukraine and Belarus apart.  One could say that this division was a missed opportunity to reestablish a larger, more powerful Russia in which Ukraine and Belarus would benefit.  The division would set in motion new politics for the region and allowed the possibility for hostilities.  Afterward, a large portion of the new independent Ukrainian state, a pet country of a certain set of local oligarchs, embraced the Banderite/OUN version of Ukrainian identity and used it to solidify separateness from Russia.  And there you have it, that is essentially why Ukraine exists today.  But notice how complicated this historical development is?  It is too much for most people to grasp, that's why most people just respond to media programming (that's been heavily influenced by the activist Uniates from Ukraine's west) and say: "Russia bad.  Ukraine good.  Ukraine's been a nation for centuries; fighting for freedom and independence, etc etc."