18 July 2024

Understanding the Old Country Part 3: Ukrainian nationalism and Orthodoxy

 Orthodox Church of Ukraine | History, Recognition, Patriarchate, & Facts |  Britannica

As I've previously related, Ukrainian nationalism is inextricably tied to Uniatism and a tendency to go into schism.


So besides Uniatism and the Papist roots of proto-Ukrainian statehood, what else is heterodox about Ukrainian nationalism?   A simple answer:  It throws away the vision and identity of "Holy Russia" and puts in its place a Uniate national idea - an idea that always gains outside support from western powers.

A more precise and philosophical answer: 
Its Anti-Monarchism and its rebuke to the Orthodox East.  A very appropriate theological articulation of Tsarism was given by a martyred hierarch of Kiev.  Here is a quote from the New Martyr St. Vladimir, Metropolitan of Kiev, during his trial by the Bolsheviks.  He was commenting on the Revolution:

“A priest who is not a monarchist is not worthy to stand at the altar table. The priest who is a republican is always a man of poor faith. God himself anoints the monarch to be head of the kingdom, while the president is elected by the pride of the people. The king stays in power by implementing God’s commandments, while the president does so by pleasing those who rule. The king brings his faithful subjects to God, while the president takes them away from God.” 

And St. Vladimir the New Martyr echos ancient fathers such as Eusebius of Caesarea: 
“Monarchy is superior to every other constitution and form of government. For polyarchy, where everyone competes on equal terms, is really anarchy and discord.”

You can find other patristic quotes along these lines.

To be clear though, I would like to make a distinction:  There is a difference between living in a society like America, where there is no state monarchy, a place whose earliest roots were Anglo Saxon settlers possessing the Anglo Saxon mistrust of authority, during an age of new political theories in their home country which continued to develop in the New World; versus living in a place like pre-revolutionary Russia, where an Orthodox monarchy was established.  There was a deliberate rebellion against this rightful authority by Ukrainianists.  And today their narratives continue to denigrate it, undermining the witness of the Orthodox Church.

Why this matters today is because the narratives of Ukrainianists stand in the way of restoring a proper Christian monarchy to Russia and Ukraine.  But more importantly than that, these narratives oppose traditional Orthodox governance and ethos in general.  When you make that the official narrative in the second largest country in the Orthodox world, you have a problem.  This is a long-term consideration.  One of the reasons why Ukrainianism is a darling of the west, and enjoys continued support, even with my own tax dollars, is because it is anti-monarchical.  Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric views the Tsar as an evil doer, instead of as the rightful Orthodox ruler of All Rus.  It violates the Old Order of Christendom and embraces Liberalism.  It rejected the rightful Tsar of the Rus and sought to replace him with a western style republic.  It rejected the reunion of the Russias, and substituted a Uniate or "Orthodox Lite" state.  Today, Russia is not a monarchy, but it could be again one day after more development.  The national narrative of Russia puts things on a course back toward Tradition, whereas Ukrainian national narratives undermine it and send things in the opposite direction.

Ukrainianism pushes Ukraine toward a so called "European future."  They see Ukraine as developing in the same Progressive social pattern as western European (heterodox) countries.  They argue that Ukraine was always a "free" country whereas Muscovites were/are slaves.  This is not true at all, and is a later retcon of history.  Very telling is that fact that there were numerous rebellions against the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in both Ukraine and Belarus from 1596 onward.  And yet after the Partitions of Poland and reunion of the Russias, rebellions by the ancestors of today's Ukrainians and Belarusians were rare.

Likewise, New Martyr St. Vladimir's successor, Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky) of Kiev, also suffered, and was imprisoned by Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petliura, when the Ukrainianists took over Kiev and formed their short-lived state.  Metropolitan Antony later  served as a ROCOR Metropolitan after evacuating with White Emigres.  He was a man of great holiness and obedience to Tradition during his career as a hierarch.  He had a fascinating life, and I would strongly recommending reading more about him.

What does this have to do with right now?  The process that is unfolding at the moment is the destabilization of the region and spread of hatred.  Who is guilty?  One party?  I think not.  But for certain, there are forces that set up this situation and prevent something better.

I would also bring up, that most people in ROCOR, including their hierarchs, both past and present, essentially believe what I believe.  That jurisdiction was more vocal about it than our historic OCA (Russian Metropolia) people, because they tended to be more educated, more political and many had fought the communists.  ROCOR was and is far more interested in articulating traditional Russophila than the OCA.  And yet, as with the OCA, ROCOR was actually dominated by hierarchs with roots in what is now Ukraine, namely: 
 
1. Metropolitan Hilarion (Kapral) who died recently.  His parents immigrated to Canada from Volhynia, in western Ukraine.  His first language in the home was Ukrainian, and he learned Russian later in life.  And yet he considered himself a Russian man, and essentially articulated the "Russian World."
2. St. John of Shanghai and San Francisco was from Kharkov.
3. Archbishop Vitaly (Maximenko) 
4. Archbishop Alypy (Gamanovich)

Remember, ROCOR was always more Russophilic and more Tsarist than the OCA.  Yet it was and is dominated by people rooted in what's now Ukraine! 

16 May 2024

A note on the tone and subject matter of A Son of the Metropolia

The internet often makes us cold and terse.  This is something endemic to it.  My writings have been no exception.  My words in my articles tend to be subdued and formal, but my words on Twitter have not followed this template.

Twitter is a place where abrupt messages are fired off, and where virtually everyone is confrontational.  It comes with the territory.  When you post on Twitter, you invariably end up getting into some kind of argument, and firing off quips and jabs at something you detest is a daily occurrence.  Teasing and being flippant are the norm.  Such is internet culture.  It is a culture where "bantzing" and "dissing" is how you engage both friends and enemies.  Crude humor is a lubricant for touchy subjects. 


I started this primarily as a place to talk about Orthodoxy, particularly Russian Orthodoxy in the US.  It was also my objective to talk about Russian culture, particularly the variety found in the OCA, in all of its vibrant and vestigial forms.  Today Russian culture is under attack much more than usual.  I have responded to detractors and pieces of media that I have found to be troublesome.  I have responded to things that I detest.  But I have been rude in my moments of righteous indignation, particularly with regard to attacks on the Orthodox Faith.  As of late, Orthodoxy has been under direct attack in the land of our ancestors: Ukraine.  The Church there is in a state of crisis both because of the war and because of the Ukrainian government's persecution.  Georgia is experiencing political upheaval and could be on the eve of a western-backed color revolution.  Belarus is in a precarious position in which it could soon undergo the same kind of nationalist modification/invention process that Ukraine (Little Russia) has been subjected to.  I have participated in poking fun at those whom I believe to be threatening Orthodoxy and spreading social liberalism in the Orthodox World. 

I ask your forgiveness if I have caused harm.  I am passionate about Orthodoxy, and believe strongly in the justness and rightness of Russian identity over alternative identities and nationalisms that are at odds with it.  I also feel that it is constructive to poke fun at some, even directly insulting them, using the same tools of desacrilization and humor that they use against us. 

10 February 2024

Understanding the Old Country Part 2: Competing national visions: Ukrainianism versus Russophila

This series continues, amid the buzz surrounding Tucker Carlson's interview this week of Vladimir Putin.  A long, complicated history was discussed during the course of that interview with mixed reactions around the world.  Hopefully this multi-part series, written from the perspective of a descendant of pre-Revolutionary Russian immigrants to America, who came from the regions in question, will shed light on the issues discussed.  My content tends to fixate more on religious issues than others, but this is probably worth a read, even by those who are not primarily interested in religious affairs in Ukraine.  My argument is that religion actually did play a major role in the development of Ukraine, as it does in virtually every other region of the world. 

Competing national visions: Ukrainianism versus Russophilia

There are competing visions everywhere.  In Ukraine, historically, there are 2 opposing visions regarding identity, nationhood, and sovereignty.  Since the coup d'etat of 2014, these 2 visions, being held by native citizens of Ukraine, have even duked it out on an actual battlefield.  While there were other visions at times, these 2 are the most relevant and impact the world today the most: Russophilia and Ukrainianism.  Other less relevant or popular visions would be:  Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth Identity, Neosoviet, general separatism, and apathy. 

Ukraine was not "liberated" from Tsarist rule, it was broken off by the heterodox west, and by the heterodox within Ukraine.  Besides the political associations with Muscovy, the way that people actually felt in Ukraine prior to WW1 was fundamentally different than today.  Ukraine's nationalist movement is more of a political movement than anything.  It used to be called, "Ukrainstvo" translated literally "Ukrainianism."  It is an "ism" and it had specific leaders and emerged from a specific group of people.  The reasons for the spread of this movement are complicated, difficult to track, and often misunderstood.  It is not cut and dry.  For that reason, the true story of Ukraine, the objective history, is never told in western media.  There is both ignorance, as well as a willful, politically-motivated intent to distort it.  An abbreviated, politicized, romantic narrative following the "David vs Goliath" architype is told.  There are geopolitical reasons for this, in addition to romanticism.

Russophilia is the term I'd use to describe the vision of the Russian nation according to traditional tsarist sensibilities.  It is difficult to say when the basis for this idea emerged.  One could say that it began when the Duchy of Moscow first began to retake Russian lands from Lithuania, which seized about half of "Kievan Rus."  It's starting point could be traced to the founding of the Tsardom in the 16th century, when the Rus finally had a king as opposed to antagonistic princes in divided micro states.  Or one could say that it emerged with the concept of Moscow as a "3rd Rome."  Russophilia is the idea that these Rus people, who all equally share in the heritage of Kievan Rus ought to have unity.  After the Mongol Invasion, the lands were decimated, creating a power vacuum.  Lithuania and Poland swept in, sometimes with blood, and seized the western Russian lands.  This is the only reason why Belarus and Ukraine developed separate characteristics from what we call "Russia" today, such as their own dialects and other peculiarities.  But Russophilia does not see itself as a movement rooted only as far back as the 16th century, but rather as the celebration and continuation of what always existed back to the beginnings of the Rus in the 9th century.

Russophilia is, objectively speaking, more Orthodox than Ukrainianism.  Ukrainianism was primarily a Uniate political orientation that emerged in Galicia, within the Austro Hungarian Empire prior to WW1.  It was advanced as an alternative to the Russophilia of those Uniates who were converting back to Orthodoxy in that region.  There were some Uniates that became Russophiles, putting them on a course back to Orthodoxy.  Because of this, the Austro Hungarian government assisted and promoted the Ukrianianists and repressed the Russophiles within their territory.  The Uniate clergy were also instrumental in spreading Ukrainian nationalism.  The Uniate Ukrainian vision was one of a Catholic, western-backed, smaller version of Russia, which vicariously operated in the line of succession from the old Kingdom of Galicia (which was made a kingdom by the crowning of Prince Daniil Romanovich by a Papal legate, the only Rus prince to submit to Rome, though he purportedly did not apostatize from Orthodoxy).  In a sense this nation of Ukraine would be the true successor to Kievan Rus, not Muscovy.  This was an idea that was and is backed by foreigners such as Poles to this very day.  This alternative nationhood, this western-backed national idea, this "Antirussia", claims more exclusive rights to the heritage of Kievan Rus.  It views Muscovy as something foreign, dirty, unsophisticated, uncivilized.  But most of all: foreign.  It denies the connection to Moscow, and celebrates the connection to the western Catholics.  It denies that the Rurik Dynasty moved to Moscow, while the local Little Russian establishment was slowly Polonized.  It denies that the Metropolitan See of Kiev and All Rus moved to Vladimir (an ancient city in Russia, near Moscow) and then to Moscow, in order to protect it from the heathen Lithuanians who occupied Kiev (and it was moved by St. Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow, who was himself a Galician!).  This movement, with its narratives, is the direct ancestor of mainstream Ukrainian nationalism today, both in terms of spirit, but even in terms of direct lineage through nationalist leaders and academics.

Within the Russian Empire, Ukrainianism was much much weaker and took on more of a political form than a folk nationalist form.  It was composed primarily by anti-monarchical liberals who sought an alternative identity and statehood formation to the Russian Empire.  One that was more local and democratic.  The reason some of them were repressed by the state was because they were rebels.  It was a mirror image of the repressions against Russophiles in Austria Hungary, and on a much smaller and less severe scale.  Some of these Ukrainianists within the Russian Empire were actually looked upon favorably in elite circles; a sort of curiosity in the age of Romanticism.  There was also a small reaction against Russification (language policy) though nobody seems to admit that Russification replaced the Polonization which came before it.  At the time it was mostly academic.  All attention and moans are directed at Muscovites, the actual, real brothers who reunited and provided an authentically Rus state, and no attention paid to the Polonized gentry, whose Polish language dominated the Little Russian upper classes, relegating the vernacular (that would later be developed into modern Ukrainian) to an unwritten peasant language.  The Polish domination is what made Ukraine separate, and yet Russia, or more precisely the Great Russians/Muscovites are the villains for reuniting and defending Orthodoxy, which was previously suppressed by the Poles.  This dismissal of Moscovite unity and consolidation, and a half-hearted celebration of Polish/Lithuanian domination is the core of the Ukrainian national idea.  (And when it comes to the relationship between Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, there is a lot to unpack, particularly when discussing nationalisms.  It is complicated.)

And here is the kicker: Ukrainianism was not even popular until Germany occupied what we now call Ukraine during WW1.  A religious component in these questions of identity was very visible in the pre-WW1 immigration to America.  For topics of ethnicity and nationalism it is useful to study religious organizations since they consist of organized communities of people, and serve as centers of culture.  But perhaps all the more so because of the role that religion plays in ethnic and national identity.  Those who identified as Ukrainian were almost all Uniates.  So very many people who came to the US and built the North American Russian Orthodox Metropolia, that later became the Orthodox Church in America, were from Ukraine yet called themselves Russians and identified with that culture.  And those people were mostly from western Ukraine, not Donbass, not Crimea, or other eastern regions of Ukraine that tend to be pro-Russian today.  There were some of these people who, after being in America or Canada for decades, decided that they were "Ukrainian" when they looked at maps of the Soviet Union and saw that the region their parents or grandparents were from was in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

It is noteworthy also that the Ukrainian language did not exist until the 19th century, and it was based primarily upon the Galician dialect.  Galicia had been controlled directly by the Kingdom of Poland for centuries, and their vernacular took on many Polishisms; whereas those to the north and east were dominated by Lithuania, which had little linguistic impact, and the vernacular was closer to Russian.  Later, the Soviets made the people in the north and east of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic learn Ukrainian, a language that was as foreign to them like Muscovite Russian language was to a Galician in 1900.  To be clear: the vernacular language spoken by peasants in Little Russia, within the Russian Empire was not equivalent to modern Ukrainian, nor did they call it Ukrainian.  Immigrants from these regions to America typically referred to their regional vernaculars as "Village Russian" or "Low Russian."

The Ukrainianist vision sees Ukraine as embracing a social evolution akin to that of the west, instead of the Orthodox east.  This is opposed to the Orthodox, eastern resistance to western liberalism, and the whole process of development of Papism and Protestantism that preceded it.  This is a version of Progressivism.  There is a good reason why pro-LGBT and other advocates for social liberalism in Ukraine are ardent Ukrainian nationalists, and were always very anti-Russian.  They see the future of Ukraine being very liberal and decadent; basically Ukraine "evolving" into what western European countries are like right now.  This is noteworthy as in most of the world the Social Left tends to be anti nationalist.

The Germans supported Ukrainianism twice during their WW1 and WW2 occupations to create disunity and prevent partisan activity.  The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists developed the Ukrainian national idea in Interwar Poland and spread it.  The Soviets reinforced it through Indigenization Policies and the formation of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, possessing the very same borders as the modern Ukrainian state, minus the region around Lvov which was part of Poland until the end of WW2.  In 1991, 3 men got together in Belovezha Forest and decided to break Russian, Ukraine and Belarus apart.  One could say that this division was a missed opportunity to reestablish a larger, more powerful Russia in which Ukraine and Belarus would benefit.  The division would set in motion new politics for the region and allowed the possibility for hostilities.  Afterward, a large portion of the new independent Ukrainian state, a pet country of a certain set of local oligarchs, embraced the Banderite/OUN version of Ukrainian identity and used it to solidify separateness from Russia.  And there you have it, that is essentially why Ukraine exists today.  But notice how complicated this historical development is?  It is too much for most people to grasp, that's why most people just respond to media programming (that's been heavily influenced by the activist Uniates from Ukraine's west) and say: "Russia bad.  Ukraine good.  Ukraine's been a nation for centuries; fighting for freedom and independence, etc etc."

26 December 2023

Understanding the Old Country Part 1: Laying the ground work for the general American/western media understanding of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus

This is the first part in a series on Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.  This topic will be approached in part from the perspective of the old Russian immigration - most of which came from what is now Ukraine and Belarus.  

The topic of Ukraine and Belarus, particularly their history, is generally not known by westerners, and most of the information available on the topic is heavily influenced by political forces.  The topic of "Russian History" presented to us, tends to be the history of the regions that compose the Russian Federation today.  It focuses heavily on the Grand Duchy/Tsardom of Muscovy, and only the major events, cities, personalities, and dynamics of the Russian Empire.  This history is more well-known, but still generally biased.  This history almost always neglects the western regions of the broad civilization of which Moscow is a part:  Ukraine and Belarus.  This history is told in such a way as to create a division of what is called "Rus" or what simply used to be called "Russia" by way of compartmentalization.  In other words, what is termed "Russian History" is really just the study of one portion of a civilization, with the implication that Belarus and Ukraine have always been separate nations, or are perhaps simply unimportant or unconnected places.  This is the story of the Old Country, as it continues to unfold. 


We shall start by framing the understanding in western media and education of the relationship of Belarus and Ukraine with Russia, as well as the general perception of Russian nationhood and nationalism. 

When discussing Russia, western media primarily upholds narratives associated with geopolitical movements.  It is not as concerned with supporting the positions of the groups listed in the following paragraphs (Ukrainianist, Polish, British), it only uses them and allows them to exist in the media ecosystem insofar as they are useful.  This media is owned and controlled by the "elites" as it is everywhere.  The elites of the west have as their geopolitical goal the weakening - and in some cases the destruction - of the Russian nation, conceptions of Russian nationality, Russophillia, etc.  This is because Russia is viewed as an adversary.  Most of the media on the topic of Russia is engineered to:  

A. Dismiss Russia's national idea. 

B. Portray Russia as a unique oppressor throughout history (much like some critics of America do, such as the 1619 Project).  

C. Assert that Russia is a usurper of the heritage of Kievan Rus, that the Tsars of Moscow/St.Petersburg unrightfully ruled what is now Ukraine and Belarus, and that there has always been a deep distinction between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

Ukrainian nationalists are arguably the most activistic Slavic group in America, and manage to get their narratives in everywhere.  They are highly organized, and their institutions regularly issue press releases.  They make a lot of noise, both in news media and academia.  Ukrainian nationalists assert that they and their ancestral lands are not a part of Russia, and were always a separate nation.  These nationalists assert that the Muscovite Tsars' rule of their lands was a foreign occupation instead of a reunion under their own national ruler.  Their narratives mesh with western critiques of empire, royalty, as well as the western obsession with underdogs.  They are a passionate lobby and are perpetually putting forth arguments in the public space.  They also have stories of suffering such as the Holodomor, or Stalin's purges, which while based on true stories, are not told honestly.  For example, they will never admit that the Holodomor also impacted other regions of the USSR, including the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, and did not constitute a genocide as such, nor that it was the local Ukrainian SSR authorities that enforced that man-made famine.  At the end of World War 2 many diehard nationalists came to America fleeing from the Red Army (and not all for the same reason).  Belarusian nationalists are similar and have similar narratives, but are a much smaller group.  They have a different historical process of development, have never been as well organized, and have never had the same "bandwidth" as Ukrainian nationalists.

Now what follows is not an attack on Polish people or nationality.  I am simply summarizing the historiography held by many Poles and how it has impacted others.  Historically, Poles have been connected to America since its founding.  Many Classically Liberal Americans were sympathetic after the Partitions of Poland, especially because of the existence of the Polish Constitution (partitions which reunited the Russian lands previously controlled by Poland).  There was always a large Polish diaspora in the US, beginning as early as the 1860s, and from the beginning they were very vocal.  Because of these connections, Polish narratives on Russia have been popularized in America.  Many Polish immigrants were in fact Polonized gentry from Belarus who fled to escape prosecution for a large revolt that they had conducted.  Many of their narratives villainize Russia for things that their own ancestors did to Russia (or "Rus," if you like) earlier in history: political manipulations/subversion, invasion, colonialism, etc.  A key part of the historiography held by many Poles is negating the Russianness of Ukraine and Belarus.  This is a means of concealing the fact that Poland took over those particular foreign lands and imposed their culture and institutions on them, ultimately causing them to develop distinctions from Muscovy aka "Great Russia" in the first place.  This negation of Russianness is also held to join supporters in Ukraine and Belarus to their anti-Russian/anti-Muscovite cause.  This was true during Polish Revolts in the 19th century when the Polish minority sought local support (in what's now Ukraine and Belarus), as well as today in modern media that comes out of Poland.  It was an historical objective of some Poles to break up the "Russian World" and keep it disunited.  And today it is the strategic objective of some Polish political forces to do so, since they want to weaken Russia and establish buffer states in Ukraine and Belarus.

Furthermore, as part of the Anglosphere, the US has always been influenced by Britain.  You're probably fully aware of the power competition between the British Empire and Russian Empire.  The British often characterized Russia as brutish, backward, and despotic.  A generally negative depiction.  "...The Russians will not have Constantinople..."  

Polish, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nationalist historical narratives demonize Russia and Russophilia.  One could say that Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist historiography is to Russian history and identity, what Howard Zinn is to American history and identity.  As time goes on, these perspectives will continue to influence the development of places like Ukraine and Belarus.  So in addition to Realpolitik and contemporary realities, history, I think, is vital to discussions about the here and now.  How we tell the story, and how we view it, affects our decisions in our own time. 

11 March 2023

A few exhibits of current religious life in Ukraine

Some brief exhibits of contemporary religion in Ukraine.  We can see the transformation of religion there.  We see the sacramentalization of nationalism:


A
Here is a video by Union of Orthodox Journalists of what Ukrainian nationalists are up to inside of churches:  
I would recommend turning on CC and Auto-translate to see what the narrator's saying.

Note the folk song that the schismatics sing inside the Church at 55 seconds.  It's not a Liturgical song.  It is about killing Muscovites, and it is nothing new.  Everyone in the know, knew about these sentiments.  Ukrainian nationalists were a threat to all pro-Russian people in Ukraine before the war.  

At 1:46 there is a video of things going on in a Uniate church.  They're singing folk songs and playing instruments in their church.  Not Liturgical.  These are the people that birthed Ukrainian nationalism.  

Later in the video, Uniates can been seen performing a Pagan folk rite at their church.

B
Here is an "icon" that Ukrainian nationalists created recently.  It depicts Stepan Bandera, Symeon Petrliura, and other nationalists on the right.  Andriy Sheptytsky, a leading Uniate bishop who was a major supporter, promoter, and spreader of Ukrainian nationalism, is in the red vestments in the front.  Taras Shevchenko, the Liberal Romantic poet, is depicted on the left, along with cossacks.  

Interestingly, St. Metropolitan Petr Mogila is depicted on the left, without a halo.  The icon is a conundrum, as it includes both Orthodox and Uniates. 



C
Another "icon" in a Uniate church.  Recognize who it is?  


D
Orthodox foreign policy expert Jim Jatras posted this video clip of an exhibition put on by schismatics.  Does this look appropriate for a Church?


Statement:  
Once again, the historical archetypes repeat.  
1.) Moscow, in spite of its own sins, defends Orthodoxy and allows the Church to exist.  The national consciousness grows around the Church; not using the Church as a prop for some national vision, but rather the opposite: building the nation around the Church.  
2.) The elites of Ukraine westernize and apostatize from Orthodoxy.  This was true in the Medieval period where the entire upper class Polonized itself.  It is true now.  This is a geopolitical reality when those lands are separated from Moscow, whether they are independent or direct vassalages of western powers.

This pattern keeps repeating, over and over again.  When the Russian Empire reunited the Russias, these problems didn't exist.  Muscovite Tsars and Dukes had their own faults and are not beyond criticism, but their deeds and the state that they built objectively supported Orthodoxy.  The national vision they built preserves and builds Orthodoxy.  

This is the historical truth.  This is why Russophilia is morally superior to Ukrainianism, both theoretically, and with respect to utilitarianism.  Ukrainianism is always a tool of heterodoxy.  It is the child of Uniates, and when it dresses up as "Orthodox" it is schismatic. 

27 December 2022

On "Russian Kwanzaa," A Commentary on WSJ Article: "This Christmas, Many Christians in Ukraine Turn Away From Russia"

In the past, I have used the snide label "Russian Kwanzaa" to refer to Ukrainian nationalism (Ukrainianism.)  And here we have a western media article on just that: Russian Kwanzaa.  

Ukrainian nationalists are creating new Christmas traditions in order to invent another difference with Russia.  Although it was not the intention of the author, this article shows how Ukrainian nationalists are perpetually inventing their nation. They cut off their nose to spite their face.

Link to article: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-christmas-many-christians-in-ukraine-turn-away-from-russia-11671933223?st=68r728pdwhqomwu&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
 
Does anyone ask the question:   If Ukraine is a real, authentic nation, with a long history as a nation, distinct from Russia, why is it that Ukrainian nationalists are always changing things that are traditional for their lands to eliminate commonalities with Russians?
 

Key takeaways in the article

-Celebrating Christmas on January 7th is the tradition in what is now called Ukraine, from ancient times.  It has been celebrated on the January 7th Old Calendar date since 988AD.  Even the Uniates, the primary inventors and super-spreaders of Ukrainianism celebrate on January 7th.  Switching to the New Calendar date of December 25th is an innovation.  This isn't traditional in Ukraine!  Just another forced change to invent a difference with Russia.

-It is noteworthy what Datskiv says about the Russian language.  It dominated Kiev long before the Soviets.  And in fact, Kiev was a Russophile city before the Soviets took over.  Not only linguistically, but nationalistically.  The intellectual circles of St. Petersburg likely had more Ukrainianists than Kiev.

-Datskiv says they're "saving themselves through their traditions" but in fact there are few traditions here.  This article, and everything else about Ukrainian nationalism, is about deliberately inventing a new culture.  They're denying the real culture, the real traditions, and then pretending that this is traditional.  It is like if American civil war reenactors were to carry around MP-40s.

-The villagers in Mali Dmytrovychi, mentioned about 3/4 of the way down, ousted a real Orthodox priest so that they could replace him with a schismatic.  They shoved away the Holy Spirit so that they could have their Ukrainianism; an idea pushed by the heterodox inside and outside of Ukraine.  

-The schismatic "priest" Volodymyr, talks about how he is delaying the switch to the western date of Christmas on account of the elderly.  Yet again, this shows the newness of Ukrainianism, including the "renovated" Liturgics and customs of the OCU and other Ukrainian nationalist religious bodies.  This proves how Ukrainianism is essentially the invention of differences with Russia.  

-Anna Datskiv's surname:  "Datskiv" is a Ukrainification of the Great Russian (Muscovite) surname "Datskov."  What this means, is that she or her husband had ancestors who lived in the Tsardom of Muscovy in the east, and at some point after 1654, an ancestor moved from there to Little Russia.  Every day when she puts on and takes off her make up, she is looking at a "Moskal," or the wife of a Moskal, in the mirror.  (Moskal is the N-word for a Muscovite that Ukrainianists use.)  What Ukrainianists do, is they convert every Russian and Surzhyk word into Ukrainian, a modern, contrived, literary language invented by nationalists to create differences with Russia.  One aspect of conversion is, they take words with the letter "o" and "e" and change it to "i."  Hence "Kiev" (Киев) the true, ancient, traditional name of the Mother of Russian Cities, gets changed to the modern "Kyiv" (Київ).  The "y" in "Kyiv" is just an alternative transliteration into English.
 
 Sadly, most western media consumers will miss these points.

29 October 2022

Orthodox Initiative #3: Pray for apostates

We live in a time of apostasy.  Many of us have watched as fellow parishioners have left the Orthodox faith.  This is not unique to Orthodoxy, as all established religious groups have lost membership.  

Ideally, the descendants of the founders and early parishioners of our parishes should still be around, and have some relationship with their old family parish (even from afar if they have moved away).  But instead, our old parishes are empty in many places despite there being many descendants of historical parishioners. 

In mission parishes, the children of converts are leaving.

The descendants of past parishioners who were close with our ancestors, people we should have a relationship with, have fallen away and are nowhere to be found.  In many cases, in our ancestral parishes, the community has been torn asunder or at least weakened by parishioners leaving the faith.  

In many cases, we know people who grew up with us, or people who are children or grand children of old family friends.  But we rarely see them.

St. Feofan the Recluse warned against the dangers of apostasy:
http://orthodoxinfo.com/inquirers/metphil_heterodox.aspx


Initiative

1.  Make a list of those whom we know to have strayed from the Orthodox Christian Faith.  Perhaps they are deliberate apostates who have publicly renounced the Faith.  Or maybe they have simply disengaged.

2.  In your daily prayers, pray for their return.  Pray for them by name.

In the Svit Prayerbook, there is a petition in the daily prayers that can be used:

"Those that have apostatized from the Orthodox faith and are blinded with the pernicious heresies do Thou enlighten with the light of Thy knowledge and incorporate with Thy Holy, Apostolic, Catholic Church." 

3.  Check with your priest and see if it is appropriate to commemorate someone who is straying from the Orthodox Faith in the Proskomedia.